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Globe Newspaper: Sounding the Death
Knell for Closure in Courtroom
Proceedings?
I. Introduction
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk,1 the
United States Supreme Court took its first step toward clarify-
ing the first amendment right of access to criminal trials. The
right, first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1980,2 was the
product of a recent conflict in interpretation of the first3 and
sixth 4 amendments to the United States Constitution, as applied
through the fourteenth amendment5 to the states.' While the
sixth amendment guarantees the accused the right to a speedy
and public trial,7 the first amendment has been construed to
give the press and public the right to attend criminal trials.8
In Globe, a Massachusetts trial judge, pursuant to a
mandatory state closure statute,9 excluded the press and the
1. 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
2. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I, provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble .... "
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... "
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in relevant part: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ......
6. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 n.6 (1941); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968).
7. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979) (sixth amendment is
a right personal to the accused, not to the public).
8. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality
opinion). This note will deal only with the right of access to criminal proceedings, not
civil proceedings. For consideration of the right in the civil context, see In re L., 24 Or.
App. 257, -, 546 P.2d 153, 155 n.1 (1976) (juvenile court judge acted properly within
his discretion in allowing a reporter to be present during a hearing to determine a treat-
ment plan for a 13-year-old child with severe emotional problems).
9. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981) provides in relevant part: "At
the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, . . . where a minor under eighteen years
1
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general public from the courtroom during the testimony of the
three minor victims at a rape trial.10 The United States Supreme
Court struck down the statute as violative of the first amend-
ment, refusing to uphold a mandatory state closure statute. In-
stead, the Court applied a balancing test to closure statutes
which considers several factors, such as the victim's age, matur-
ity, and understanding.11 This holding affects legal practitioners,
the media, the public, and victims of crime.1 2  Significantly,
Globe has triggered uncertainty as to which, if any, traditionally
sensitive, closed portions of proceedings 3 will still be afforded
that protection.
Part II of this note presents an historical overview of the
public trial and the controversies which surround it. Part III dis-
cusses the Globe opinions, and Part IV analyzes the impact of
the Supreme Court decision on sex crime victims, the press, and
the public. In addition, Part IV analyzes the implications of
Globe in relation to other traditionally closed portions of pro-
ceedings. After evaluating the Supreme Court's application of
the balancing test set forth in Globe, Part V concludes that it is
highly unlikely that closure in the trials of sex crimes will ever
again be allowed. This note further concludes that closure is
highly unlikely in any case other than one in which there is a
threat to human life.
II. Background
The public trial has been a tradition deeply rooted in the
English common law since the time of William the Conqueror. 4
of age is the person upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been com-
mitted, . . . the presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the court room,
admitting only such persons as may have a direct interest in the case." Id.
10. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
11. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2620-22. See
infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
12. See Goodale, Globe Newspaper Case Expands Media Right of Access to Trials,
NAT'L L.J., July 19, 1982, at 24-25.
13. As to these proceedings, see infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
14. See generally E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1922) (back-
ground on common law public trials). See also Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6
TEMP. L.Q. 381, 381 (1932); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S.
Ct. at 2617; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-73 (1980) (plural-
ity opinion).
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The same tradition was also evident in early American legal his-
tory, and the public trial was expressly provided for in the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 5 Legal scholars
have offered a variety of reasons for this tradition of openness
and its continued necessity. Professor David M. O'Brien wrote:
The publicity of trials is principally viewed as deterring judicial
arbitrariness, thereby ensuring the accused a right to a fair
trial. . . .The presence of members of the public is also thought
to reduce the possibility of a witness's perjury while at the same
time encouraging individuals who possess relevant information to
come forth and testify. Finally, open trials serve important public
interests. . . .Publicity both educates people about the operation
of the judiciary and provides an opportunity for members of the
public to scrutinize the administration of justice. 6
Despite what appears to be an "unbroken, uncontradicted his-
tory"17 of openness in criminal trials, however, several issues
15. The sixth amendment refers only to the accused: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CONST amend. VI
(emphasis added). It has been suggested that this language was not intended by the
framers to alter the common law tradition of open trials. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 427 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971) (an historical approach to individual liberties);
SouRcEs OF OUR LIBERTY 188 (R. Perry ed. 1959) (a documentary history of individual
liberties in the United States Constitution).
16. D. O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW 125-26 (1981). Jeremy Bentham re-
garded the public trial as a keystone, stating, "Without publicity, all other checks are
insufficient; in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recorda-
tion, appeal, whatever other institutions might present themselves in the character of
checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as
checks only in appearance." 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827).
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), Chief Justice Burger
advanced several important governmental interests in support of the public trial. He saw
the public trial as prophylactically providing an outlet for community concern, hostility,
and emotion after a particularly heinous crime. He also saw a check on the proper func-
tioning of the judicial system inasmuch as the openness discouraged perjury, misconduct,
and biased opinions. The Chief Justice further noted that the educational value of the
public trial was an important interest accruing to the public. Id. at 569-73.
17. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion). See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), in which Justice Black wrote:
We have been unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in
camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country.
Nor have we found any record of even one such secret criminal trial in England
since abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever
convicted people secretly is in dispute. . . . This nation's accepted practice of
guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in our English Common Law
19831
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have arisen in recent American jurisprudence concerning the
public nature of the criminal trial. 18
A primary issue in the public trials controversy is whether
the press and public have any right to gather information. The
Supreme Court, having often considered this issue, 9 has gener-
ally found that there is a right, albeit a limited right, to gather
information from governmental institutions.0 The right was first
explicitly recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
1972 in Branzburg v. Hayes,2 a case involving a newsman's right
to withhold confidential information in grand jury proceedings;
the right has been continuously refined throughout the 1970's
and into the 1980's. Among the governmental institutions to
which this limited right to gather information has been extended
Heritage.
Id. at 266. Accord Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), in which Justice Clark
wrote, "[t]he principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence has long been
reflected in the 'Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.' " Id. at 349 (quoting In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268).
18. A distinction must be drawn between the issue of the public trial and that of
trial publicity. The latter issue involves media coverage of and the dissemination of in-
formation from trials while the former involves the openness of the courtroom during a
trial. This Note focuses only on the public trial and the right of access to such a trial.
19. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
20. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) in which it was stated that
"without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be evis-
cerated." Id. at 681. See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974)
(federal limitations on press visitors to prisons upheld because public access was gener-
ally limited); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974) (California regulation prohibit-
ing press interviews with prisoners upheld because the press had no specially secured
right of access not available to the general public). See generally Comment, The Right of
the Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 166
(1975) (analysis of the constitutional basis for the right to gather information); Note,
The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1505
(1974) (analysis of the right to gather and its limitations).
21. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzburg, three reporters, Branzburg, Pappas, and
Caldwell, had written articles regarding narcotics, Massachussetts' Black Panthers, and
California's Black Panthers respectively. All three had refused to disclose the identities
of their informants after having been subpoenaed by a grand jury. Id. at 667-79. The
Supreme Court refused to give these refusals constitutional protection viewing the bur-
den on news-gathering as uncertain and insufficient. Id. at 690. Notwithstanding the
Court's refusal to give constitutional protection to these particular petitioners, the ma-
jority recognized the need for such protection stating that "without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/8
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are prisons, 2 jails, military bases,24 and courts.25 In recent
years, the courts have been at the center of much of the
controversy.
There are certain recognized exceptions to the general right
to gather information. These include cases involving undercover
agents, 6 trade secrets, 7 hijacker profiles, 8 and sexual abuse.29
In addition, judges have discretion to exclude people from the
courtroom to prevent disorder or disturbance,30 control over-
crowding,31 and protect certain witnesses.3 2  Notwithstanding
22. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (press access to
prison limited to scope of public access).
23. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (press access recognized,
but limited to exclude area of jail in which a suicide occurred).
24. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (federal regulation prohibiting
demonstrations on military bases upheld absent prior approval).
25. See infra notes 26-32.
26. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975) (exclusion of courtroom spectators during testimony of two
undercover narcotics agents); People v. Eason, 40 N.Y.2d 297, 353 N.E.2d 587, 386
N.Y.S.2d 673 (1976)(public excluded during undercover agents' testimony); People v.
Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71, 286 N.E.2d 265, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
911 (1973) (public excluded during testimony of active undercover narcotics agents). But
see People v. Cuevas, 50 N.Y.2d 1022, 409 N.E.2d 1360, 431 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1980) (exclu-
sion during undercover agents' testimony struck down as trial judge did not adequately
investigate the asserted threat of harm).
27. See, e.g., Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1974) (exclusion of the press and public permitted during the discussion of a secret pro-
cess of manufacturing plastics). The Stamicarbon court noted that "[the need for a
sensitive accommodation of both interests involved in this case is emphasized by the fact
that no fewer than twenty states . .. have enacted statutes making appropriation on
unauthorized disclosed [sic] of trade secrets a crime." Id. at 540 n.11.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991
(1972) (press, public, and defendant excluded from a suppression hearing during revela-
tion of hijacker profile criteria and discussion related thereto); United States v. Lopez,
328 F.Supp. 1077 (1971) (exclusion of press, public, and possibly of the defendant); But
cf. United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 248 (1973) (exclusion of the defendant during
discussion related to hijacker profile was deemed violative of his sixth amendment
rights).
29. See, e.g., Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (1958) (exclusion of general pub-
lic, but not press, during the testimony of a nine-year-old rape victim disallowed); Me-
lanson v. O'Brien, 191 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1951) (entire rape trial involving minor victim
closed to the public); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935) (exclusion of
public during testimony of minor rape victim permitted).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 542 F.2d 770 (1976) (exclusion of public at
rendering of verdict in a bombing case where disruption was threatened if the verdict
was unfavorable to the defendants).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (1949) (exclusion of persons hay-
5
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these recognized exceptions, courts have restricted public access
to criminal trials in very few cases. Indeed, in cases where a
courtroom was closed to the press and public, it was done on a
temporary, and often partial, basis.3 3
Traditionally, courts have employed a common law and
sixth amendment analysis to resolve access cases.34 It was often
disputed whether the sixth amendment right to a public trial
was one personal to the accused or general to the public and
press.35 This issue was eventually resolved in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale.s6
In Gannett, the press and public were excluded from a pre-
trial suppression hearing in a murder case for fear that adverse
publicity would jeopardize the defendants' rights to a fair trial.3 7
The Supreme Court, in upholding the exclusion, held that the
sixth amendment right to a public trial was a personal right of
the accused, not one of access to the press and public. 38 This
holding, although it can be narrowly construed to include only
pre-trial proceedings, 9 was a major setback in the public's ef-
forts to gain recognition of a constitutional right of access to
criminal trials.4 0 Its effect, however, was not as momentous as it
ing no connection with the case to preserve the morals of the courtroom's youthful
spectators).
32. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957 (1970) (menacing of government's sole identification witness
was suitable ground for exclusion of menacers); United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350
F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965) (exclusion of the general public allowed when intimidation and
harassment of witnesses occurred).
33. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 430-32 n.ll (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
34. See generally Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1308 (1978) (examination of asserted rights to attend pre-trial suppression hearings after
Gannett).
35. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); United States v. Cian-
frani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
36. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
37. Id. at 375.
38. Id. at 391. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that "[tihe Constitu-
tion nowhere mentions any right of access to a criminal trial on the part of the public; its
[sixth amendment) guarantee . . . is personal to the accused." Id. at 379-80.
39. There was considerable confusion after the Gannett opinion as to its scope. Jus-
tice Stewart used the words "trial" and "pre-trial" seemingly interchangeably in his
opinion thus causing a rash of extrajudicial comments. See Keeffe, The Boner Called
Gannett, 66 A.B.A. J. 227, 227 (1980).
40. See S. Rudoff and R. Sugarman, Fair Trial-Free Press - Key Issues Linger, 184
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/8
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might have appeared at the time.
In light of Gannett, the courts moved more toward applying
a first amendment analysis in access cases. Indeed, cases have
suggested that the Supreme Court was leaning toward first
amendment protection for the right of access to information.41
Those cases, however, generally dealt with the first amendment
right to disseminate information once gathered.42 It was not un-
til 1980 that the same protection was afforded the right of access
to such information.
In 1980, the Supreme Court finally recognized a general first
amendment right of access to criminal trials. In Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia," the press and public were ex-
cluded from the courtroom during the fourth attempt to try a
defendant for one murder." In reversing the Virginia Supreme
Court's affirmance of the closure order, the Supreme Court held
that implicit in the first amendment was a right of access sug-
gested and supported by an "unbroken, uncontradicted his-
tory"'" of openness and by several important governmental pur-
poses.'6 The right, however, was not deemed absolute by the
Court. It is noteworthy that no standards were set forth by
which future cases could be evaluated.' Chief Justice Burger,
writing the plurality opinion, merely stated that a closure order
would have to be supported by "an overriding interest articu-
N.Y.L.J. Aug. 28, 1980, at 1, col.2.
41. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). For a discussion of this
decision, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (first
amendment protection afforded persons who reported truthful information concerning
pending cases or grand jury investigations). See also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367
(1947) (contempt citation issued for publication of editorial pertaining to pending cases
struck down). In Craig, Justice Douglas wrote: "A trial is a public event. What transpires
in the court room is public property." Id. at 374.
43. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
44. Id. at 559-60.
45. Id. at 573.
46. Id. at 569-73. See supra note 16 for an exposition of the reasons cited.
47. The plurality opinion did not address the issue of standards, stating:
[w]e have no occasion here to define the circumstances in which all or parts of a
criminal trial may be closed to the public . . . . Just as government may impose
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets . . . so
may a trial judge, in the interest of the fair administration of justice, impose rea-
sonable limitations on access to a trial.
Id. at 581 n.18.
19831
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lated in findings" in order for it to be effective.4
Although Richmond Newspapers was the "watershed
case ' 4e in this area of communications and first amendment law,
the opinion left several questions unanswered. The most crucial
of these questions was the extent of the newly-recognized right
of access.50 In addition, it was unclear whether the right ex-
tended to the civil context51 or to pre-trial proceedings.6 In
1982, the Supreme Court began to clarify Richmond Newspa-
pers with Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk.3
III. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk"
A. The Facts and the Lower Courts' Decisions
In April, 1979, a Massachusetts trial judge excluded the
press and the general public from a courtroom during a rape
trial involving three minor victims. 5 Globe Newspaper Company
(Globe), a local publisher, moved to compel the court to revoke
the closure order and to hold hearings on related preliminary
48. Id. at 581.
49. Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring). This classification of the Richmond case was
first coined by Justice Stevens.
50. Despite the uncertainty as to the unanswered questions, it was generally agreed
that Richmond Newspapers was a major victory for the press. See, e.g., Note, Public
Trials and a First Amendment Right of Access: A Presumption of Openness, 60 NzB. L.
REv. 169 (1981); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REv. 75, 149 (1980)
(description of Richmond Newspapers as a "significant and salutary recasting of much
first amendment doctrine"); Richmond Decision Seen as Having a Major Effect, 6 ME-
DIA L. RPTm. 11 (1980) (characterization of Richmond Newspapers as "one of the two or
three most important decisions in the history of the first amendment").
51. The Richmond Newspapers Court did, however, recognize that civil trials have
been historically open. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17.
52. The Richmond Newspapers Court did not specifically address how the right of
access applied to pre-trial proceedings. It is interesting to note, however, that on the
same day that Richmond Newspapers was decided, the Court denied certiorari to a case
involving a challenge to the order of the closure of a pre-trial suppression hearing. See
Merola ex rel. New York v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 985, 393 N.E.2d 1038, 419 N.Y.S.2d 965
(1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 910 (1980). There has yet to be a settlement of this issue
despite public outcries for a resolution. See, e.g., Wiping the Graffiti Off the Courtroom,
N.Y. Times, July 3, 1980, at A18, col.1 (calling for the overruling of Gannett).
53. 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
54. Id.
55. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 848-49, 401 N.E.2d 360,
363 (1980). The defendant was charged with the forcible rape and forced unnatural rape
of three girls aged 16, 16, and 17. Id. at 849, 401 N.E.2d at 363.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/8
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motions.56 Relying on a state statute," the trial court denied
Globe's motions and ordered the courtroom closed during the
entire trial. 58
Globe subsequently sought injunctive relief from a single
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 9 After
again being denied relief, Globe appealed to the full court.60 In
the meantime, however, the defendant's trial proceeded, result-
ing in an acquittal.61
Several months after the defendant's acquittal, the supreme
judicial court issued its judgment, holding that the closure stat-
ute6" related to the closure of a trial only during the minor vic-
tims' testimony. 3 The court further noted that the word "shall"
in the statute was mandatory in nature, thus requiring such clo-
sure. 6 4 Closure of the remaining portions of the trial, however,
was left to the trial judge's "sound discretion." 5
56. Id. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 363.
57. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981). See supra note 9.
58. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 363.
Both the defense and the prosecution immediately reacted to this order. The defendant
objected and the prosecution stated, for purposes of the record, that the order was issued
on the court's own motion and not at the request of the Commonwealth. Id.
59. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 847, 401 N.E.2d 360, 362
(1980). Globe's petition was filed pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211, § 3 (West
1958 & Supp. 1982) which provides in relevant part: "The supreme judicial court shall
have general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent
errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided; ... [T]he justices of
the supreme judicial court shall also have general superintendence of the administration
of all courts of inferior jurisdiction ..... During the hearing on the issue, the Com-
monwealth waived all rights to exclude the press on behalf of the victims. Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. at 849, 401 N.E.2d at 363.
60. Id. at 847, 401 N.E.2d at 362.
61. Id. at 849, 401 N.E.2d at 363. The facts here give rise to the issue of whether the
case is moot. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court initially considered the case moot. Id.
at 847-48, 401 N.E.2d at 362. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 71-74
and accompanying text.
62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981). See supra note 9 for the text
of the statute.
63. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 861, 401 N.E.2d 360, 370
(1980).
64. Id. at 864, 401 N.E.2d at 370-71.
65. Id. at 864, 401 N.E.2d at 371. The court recognized two governmental purposes
behind the statute. First, the purpose of encouraging young victims of sexual offenses to
report such offenses was furthered by the closure of the trial. Second, the court saw the
provision as designed to protect young victims from psychological harm after they have
come forward as witnesses. Id. at 860, 401 N.E.2d at 369. In addition, the court reserved
19831
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Globe subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which vacated the judgment of the supreme judicial court
and remanded the action for consideration in light of the recent
decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.6 The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, on remand, again dis-
missed Globe's appeal6 7 noting that sexual assault cases are "one
notable exception" to the "unbroken tradition of openness." in
criminal trials.68 Globe again appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction. 9
B. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The majority opinion70
The Court first considered whether the acquittal of the de-
fendant rendered the case moot.7 1 It applied the principle of
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC 72 that "jurisdiction is not
necessarily defeated simply because the order attacked has ex-
pired, if the underlying dispute . . . is one 'capable of repetition,
yet evading review.' ,,73 In doing so, the majority found that the
the first and sixth amendment claims made by Globe pending the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. at 854, 401 N.E.2d at 366.
66. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
67. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, - Mass -... 423 N.E.2d 773,
781 (1981).
68. Id. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 778. In its opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court cited
the following sexual assault cases as authority: United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff,
561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978) (court closed to the public
during the testimony of the 21-year-old victim); Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, (8th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Harris v. Bishop, 386 U.S. 964 (1967) (closing of rape trial
during the testimony of the 23-year-old victim). Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
- Mass. at - , 423 N.E.2d at 778. In addition, the court pointed to the "genuine
state interests" in the mandatory-closure rule. Id. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 779.
69. 454 U.S. 1051 (1981).
70. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, was joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, White, and Powell. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined.
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.
71. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2618. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 limits the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to actual cases and
controversies.
72. 219 U.S. 498 (1911). Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S.
Ct. at 2618.
73. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976) (quoting Southern Pa-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/8
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issue at hand met that standard since it was foreseeable that the
publisher would someday be subjected to another trial closure
pursuant to Massachusetts' mandatory closure statute. 4 Thus,
the majority proceeded to the merits of the case.
The majority began its analysis noting that "[u]nderlying
the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the
common understanding that 'a major purpose of that Amend-
ment was to protect the free discussion of governmental af-
fairs.' ",75 This protection, the majority stated, ensured effective
participation in the American republican form of self-govern-
ment and informed discussion of governmental affairs.7
The Court then analyzed two features of the criminal justice
system to demonstrate the propriety of constitutional protection
of the right of access to criminal trials. First, it recognized the
historical openness of the criminal trial to the press and the gen-
eral public, stating: "This uniform rule of openness has been
viewed as significant in constitutional terms not only 'because
the Constitution carries the gloss of history,' but also because 'a
tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of expe-
rience.' ,,7 Second, the majority commented that "the institu-
tional value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both logic
and experience" since public scrutiny "enhances the quality and
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process. . .[and] fos-
ters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public re-
spect for the judicial process. '7 8
After recognizing the constitutional right of access to crimi-
nal trials, the majority warned that the right was not absolute.7
Instead, each closure order was to be subjected to a balancing
test. This test required a showing that any denial of access to
criminal trials is "necessitated by a compelling governmental in-
terest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."80 The ma-
cific Terminal Co. v. I.C.C., 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
74. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2618.
75. Id. at 2619 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
76. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
77. Id. (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 589).
78. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
79. Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plural-
ity opinion)).
80. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2620. See
Brown v. Hartlage, 102 S. Ct. 1523 (1980), in which it was stated: "When a State seeks to
19831
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
jority then examined the two state interests asserted by Massa-
chusetts in support of the mandatory closure rule.
Massachusetts first asserted that the mandatory closure rule
was necessary to protect the minor victims of crime from further
trauma and embarassment 1 While acknowledging the compel-
ling nature of this interest, the majority dismissed it as an insuf-
ficient justification of a mandatory closure rule. Instead, it rec-
ommended a case-by-case analysis considering several factors:
the victim's age, psychological maturity and understanding, the
desires of the victim, and the interests of the parents and rela-
tives.2 The majority commented further that, in the instant
case, the victims' names were in the public record, and that
there was some indication that they were willing to testify in
open court.88 The Court thus determined that the mandatory
rule could not be considered "a narrowly tailored means of ac-
commodating the state's asserted interest."8
Massachusetts also asserted that its closure rule was
designed to encourage minor victims to come forward and pro-
vide accurate testimony.8 5 This interest, the majority stated, was
"[nlot only .. .speculative in empirical terms, but .. . also
open to serious question as a matter of logic and common
sense. ' 6 Citing the fact that the statute could not prevent the
restrict directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, the First Amendment
surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported not only by a legitimate
state interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction operate without unnecessa-
rily circumscribing protected expression." Id. at 1529.
81. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
In its opinion . . , the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts described the
interests in the following terms: '(a) to encourage minor victims to come forward
to institute complaints and give testimony ... ; (b) to protect minor victims of
certain sex crimes from public degradation, humiliation, demoralization, and psy-
chological damage ... ; (c) to enhance the likelihood of credible testimony from
such minors, free of confusion, fright or embellishment; (d) to promote the sound
and orderly administration of justice ... ; (e) to preserve evidence and obtain just
convictions.'
Id. at 2621 n.18 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, - Mass. at -,
423 N.E.2d at 779).
82. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2621.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2622.
86. Id.
[Vol. 3:395
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/8
1983] COURTROOM CLOSURE 407
publication of the substance of the minors' testimony,8 7 the ma-
jority posited that the statute did not effectively advance the as-
serted interest.88 Even if the interest was effectively advanced,
the Court doubted that it was sufficient to withstand constitu-
tional attack because it could be used in various situations and
thus "proves too much." 89
Thus, since the state's interests did not meet the majority's
test, the mandatory closure statute was held unconstitutional as
violative of the first amendment.90
ii. Chief Justice Burger's dissent
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, began his
dissent by characterizing the majority's holding as advancing "a
disturbing paradox."9 He noted that while the states were al-
lowed to protect minors charged with crimes, 92 they were not al-
lowed to protect minors who were the innocent victims of
crime.9 3 This paradox, coupled with what the Chief Justice con-
sidered "a cavalier rejection of the serious interests supporting
[the] mandatory closure rule, ' ' " contributed to the majority's al-
leged misrepresentation of the historical record of open proceed-
ings in cases involving sexually abused minors.9
Chief Justice Burger initially balanced the state's interest in
protecting victims against the first amendment rights of press
and public. He was unable to find more than a "minimal im-
pact'"" on the first amendment right. On the other hand, he rec-
87. Id. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (invasion of privacy
action brought by father of deceased rape victim after publication of the victim's name).
See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (statute punishing publi-
cation of the name of a minor convicted of a crime declared unconstitutional).
88. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2622.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2622. In a brief concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stressed that neither
the Court's decision in Globe nor the Richmond Newspapers decision extended beyond
the criminal context. Id. at 2623.
91. Id. at 2623 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
92. Id. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 119, § 60A (West 1970 & Supp. 1982)
(protection of minor offenders from public inspection of delinquency records).
93. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2623 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2624.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2625. In his characterization of the impact of the closure statute as mini-
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ognized Massachusetts' interest in protecting a minor from cer-
tain psychological damage as overriding such first amendment
concerns.97
-The Chief Justice next attacked the majority's characteriza-
tion of the state's latter argument as "'open to serious question
as a matter of logic and common sense.'"" He argued that the
majority had misperceived the crux of the state's argument. In-
stead of focusing on the prevention of the humiliation of the vic-
tim by having to testify before a courtroom of strangers, he con-
tended, the majority mistakenly viewed the issue as one of
confidentiality. 99 He concluded: "Many will find it difficult to
reconcile the concern so often expressed for the rights of the ac-
cused with the callous indifference exhibited today for children
who, having suffered the trauma of rape . . . are denied the
modest protection the Massachusetts legislature provided. 10 0
IV. Analysis
The Globe decision was a much needed clarification of the
first amendment right of access to criminal trials. The effects of
the decision will be felt, to varying degrees, by the press, the
public, and victims of rape. The question remains, however,
whether the case should have been heard by the Supreme Court.
In its dismissal of the mootness claim, 01 the majority used
mal, Chief Justice Burger contended that both the press and the public would have
prompt and full access to all of the victims' testimony after it was given in the closed
courtroom. Id. Furthermore, the Chief Justice noted that there was a strong indication
that the victims would only have testified upon certain guarantees of strict privacy. Id.
at 2623 n.1.
97. Id. at 2626. See generally BOHMER & BLUMBERG, Twice Traumatized: The Rape
Victim and the Courtroom, 58 JUDiCAT UR 390 (1975) (report of study of rape trials and
their effects on victims); LmA, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense
in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. Rav. 977 (1969) (analysis of the rights and
needs of the child victim before and during trial).
98. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2622 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 2622). See supra text accompanying note
87.
99. Id. at 2626.
100. Id. at 2627. In a brief dissent, Justice Stevens contended that the Court never
should have reached the merits of the case because the case was moot. Id. at 2629. In-
deed, Justice Stevens saw the majority's decision as an expansion of the mootness doc-
trine in cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 2627 (quoting Southern
Pacific Terminal Co. v. I.C.C., 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
101. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" standard"'° to
justify the Court's assertion of jurisdiction in Globe. The reli-
ance on this standard in this instance, as Justice Stevens
pointed out in dissent,1 03 expands this exception to the mootness
doctrine. This expansion is demonstrated in that the statute, "as
presently construed," had never been applied in a live contro-
versy.1 04 Globe was appealing closure of the entire trial. It could
not have appealed the supreme judicial court's mandatory par-
tial closure construction, because this construction had not been
applied to the rape trial in question. This suggests that Globe
was a mere advisory opinion, and, thus, the Court's assertion of
jurisdiction was erroneous. 05 The Court was apparently over-
zealous in its desire to resolve the ambiguities which followed
Richmond Newspapers.
Notwithstanding the dubious assertion of jurisdiction in this
case, the Globe Court set forth a balancing test which may be
instrumental in the future construction of the first amendment
right of access to criminal trials. The majority stated: "Where
• * * the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to
inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown
that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental in-
terest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'" This
strict standard was justified by the Globe Court through its ref-
erences to the historical openness of the criminal trial and the
public policy value of providing a check on the criminal justice
system.10 7 The balancing test finally gives meaning to the Rich-
mond Newspapers Court's requirement of "an overriding inter-
102. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
103. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2627-28 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). See also Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. I.C.C., 219 U.S. at 515.
104. Id. at 2627. Justice Stevens pointed out that after the initial closure order of
the entire trial, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussetts construed the word
"shall" in the statute as mandating closure only during the testimony of the minor vic-
tim. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. at 864, 401 N.E.2d at 370-71.
105. The Supreme Court is without the power to give advisory opinions. See Stearns
v. Wood, 236 U.S. 75 (1915); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); United
States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297 (1909). It has long been considered practice not to decide
abstract, hypothetical, or contingent questions. See Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
337 (1937); District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1909).
106. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2620 (empha-
sis added).
107. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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est articulated in findings." '
The Globe decision will have its gravest effect on the vic-
tims of sex crimes. The protection of these victims has indeed
been "one notable exception"' 09 to the historical openness of the
criminal trial. 10 The test provided by the Globe majority, how-
ever, effectively destroys this exception. In its place, the Court
proposed a case-by-case analysis of such factors as the victim's
age, psychological maturity and understanding, the desires of
the victim, the nature of the crime, and the desires of the par-
ents and relatives."'
In the context of the Globe factual situation, the Court pur-
ported to apply this balancing test. There is some doubt, how-
ever, as to whether the facts as analyzed were an accurate repre-
sentation of the situation. For instance, the majority indicated
that the victims "may have been willing to testify despite the
presence of the press. 1" 2 Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his
dissent, however, that the victims' willingness to testify in open
court was based largely on guarantees of anonymity which are
rarely given."' The omission of this fact in the majority opinion
demonstrates the majority's anxiousness to strike down the clo-
sure statute and to effectively create a virtually irrebuttable pre-
sumption of openness in the trials of sex crimes. The majority
did, however, create the balancing test which, theoretically,
would permit closure when the factors weighed evidenced a se-
108. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 581. The Richmond News-
papers plurality expressly reserved the question of standards, thereby creating the need
for cases like Globe. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
109. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, - Mass. at - , 423 N.E.2d at 778.
See, e.g., United States v. Geise, 262 F.2d 151 (1958) (exclusion of public, but not press,
from trial for rape of minor a valid exercise of judicial discretion). See also The First
Amendment Right of Access to Sex Crime Trials, 22 B.C.L. REV. 361 (discussion of ra-
tionales behind such closure and suggested compromises between the rights of victims
and the rights of press and public).
110. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
111. Id. at 2621.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2623 n.1. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
It certainly cannot be said that the victims . . . consented to testifying in open
court .... "Each of [the three victims] indicated that they had the same [pri-
vacy] concerns .... And they stated that if it were at all possible to obtain a
guarantee that this information [names, photographs, or personal data] would not
be used, then they wouldn't object to the press being included."
[Vol. 3:395
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vere threat of harm. In doing so, the Supreme Court set the tone
for future applications of the Globe test by its application of the
test to the particular facts of this case. By placing such great
emphasis on the benefits which would accrue to the government
and the public and so little weight on the interests of the vic-
tims, the Court has implicitly approved future unbalanced appli-
cations of its own balancing test.
The majority's creation of such a strict standard will also
have an effect on the press and public. Both groups will now be
able to know not only the substance of the victims' testimony,
but also the manner in which the victims testified. It is difficult
to see what legitimate interest the press and public have in wit-
nessing this testimony, and the risk of media sensationalism is
greatly enhanced. Additionally, it can be contended that the
deprivation of first-hand observation has only an incidental im-
pact on the right to gather information, since closure was man-
dated during only one portion of the trial. Furthermore, in an-
swering the state's assertion that closure protects the victim, the
majority noted that the victims' names were already in the pub-
lic record and that transcripts of the trial were available." 4 This
very response should have answered the majority's concern that
"free discussion" would be impeded. As Chief Justice Burger
emphasized in dissent, the purpose of the closure statute was
not to preserve confidentiality, but to prevent the victim from
trauma or embarassment. Thus, Globe merely gives the press
and the public the additional right of being present in the
courtroom, since their first amendment right to know was never
abridged.
In addition to the effects that Globe will have on the sex
crime exception, it will have vast implications for other tradi-
tionally closed portions of criminal proceedings. A categorization
of the various interests to be balanced pursuant to Globe will
suggest a hierarchy of interests and their corresponding weight
on the Globe scale.
The first category would consist of those cases involving a
threat to human life. The undercover agent,1 5 hijacker profile,'
114. Id. at 2621.
115. In United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (1975), the court
stated that "shielding the identity of a police witness, preserving his future usefulness,
1983]
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and witness protection'1 7 exceptions will all fall into this cate-
gory. After Globe, it remains unlikely that courts will deny clo-
sure in the first two of these exceptions." s Although not ex-
pressly stated in the Globe opinion, the majority implied that
had the victims' ages, psychological maturity, and understanding
been such that they would suffer additional trauma or embarass-
ment in open court, then closure would be allowed. By implica-
tion, then, the Court would allow the protection of one's life as
well as one's psychological state. It seems safe to posit that the
lives of agents and potential passengers far outweigh the "insti-
tutional value'""9 of the public trial on the Globe scale. As to the
third exception, witness protection, the answer is not as clear. If
the identity of the witness is to be preserved, closure will most
likely be allowed if human life is at stake. If, however, the mere
harassment or embarassment of the witness is involved, the
court is likely to be more reticent in granting closure orders for
any portion of the trial.
A second category of interests would include those cases
dealing with the threat of economic harm. An exception that
falls within this category is trade secrets. 20 These cases fall
and safeguarding his life provides an adequate justification for excluding the public
. " Id. at 1274-75.
116. In United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (1972), the court wrote: "We need no
citation of authority or statistics to establish that. . . hijacking. . . poses a continuing
hazard to public travel." Id. at 669.
117. In United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 957 (1970), the trial judge, after learning that the government's sole
identification witness was in mortal fear of certain courtroom spectators, cleared the
courtroom. In permitting that closure, the circuit court stated that "[aibsent quite ex-
traordinary circumstances, the trial counsel and trial judge then on the scene should be
presumed to be the best qualified to appraise the situation requiring trial rulings." Id. at
129.
118. Throughout its opinion, the majority stressed that its holding was limited. In
fact, James Goodale, a prominent communications lawyer, pointed out that "there are
many limiting features to the [Globe] opinion. There are 27 footnotes that almost act as
a counterpoint to the main theme of the opinion, most of which seek to narrow the
opinion." Goodale, Globe Newspaper Case Expands Media Right of Access to Trials,
NAT'L L.J., July 19, 1982, at 25. He then suggests that the footnotes were inserted only to
persuade the Chief Justice to join the opinion as he was the author of the landmark
Richmond Newspapers opinion. Id. These limiting features of the opinion and the pro-
posed case-by-case analysis suggest that the Court might allow closure if sufficiently jus-
tified by the state.
119. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
120. See, e.g., Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/8
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lower in the hierarchy of interests because they do not approach
the import of protection of human life or prevention of psycho-
logical trauma. In Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid
Co., '2 for instance, the court stated that "[tihe precarious bal-
ance between private claims and the constitutional right to a
public trial may be struck more easily when the accused is not
faced with loss of liberty. ' 12 2 Thus, the court willingly subordi-
nated even the rights of the defendant when the only considera-
tion was economic. In light of Globe, the trade secret exception
will be available only upon a showing of greater than economic
harm, effectively destroying this exception.
The third category of interests includes those cases where
closure is allowed to preserve the decorum and dignity of the
courtroom. This exception has two parts: overcrowding and
courtroom disruption. In cases of overcrowding, the Court is
likely to continue to permit closure under the protection of
human life rationale. In the second part of this exception, how-
ever, closure is not likely to result.
Judges have traditionally been allowed to take certain steps
to prevent courtroom disruption.12 3 When press coverage or pub-
lic behavior has proved disruptive, convictions have been over-
turned by the Supreme Court. The defendant's right to a fair
trial is superior to the press' and public's right to gather infor-
mation. 12  Considering the Court's recognition of the constitu-
tional right of access in Richmond Newspapers, one would ex-
pect increased judicial tolerance of media coverage of trials.
After Globe, a more stringent burden of proof is imposed upon
those moving for closure. Whether closure to prevent courtroom
1974).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 540.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 542 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1976) (limited exclusion
of spectators from courtroom during verdict delivery in a bombing case permitted).
124. Cases in this area bring forward another very important line of thought as to
the precarious balance between media coverage of the trial and the fair trial rights of the
defendant. The landmark cases in this area, however, are illustrative of the issue dealt
with in this Note, the right of access. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (conviction
for swindling overturned when the Court determined that the televising of pre-trial and
trial proceedings prevented defendant from receiving a fair trial). See also Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (murder conviction overturned when Court found that the
publicity surrounding the trial prevented the defendant from a receiving a fair trial).
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disruption will be necessary in the future is uncertain. An elec-
tronically discreet media is rapidly evolving. Eventually, the
public will view criminal trials in their own homes.1"5 This would
remove any disruption from the courtroom and effectively de-
stroy the decorum exception.
V. Conclusion
Although the United States Supreme Court recognized the
first amendment right of access to criminal trials in Richmond
Newspapers, the Globe decision was its first attempt to define
this right. The Court set forth a balancing test which, if applied
properly, could provide constructive guidance in determining
closure. The Globe Court's application of this test, however, has
arguably placed an insurmountable burden on the state to jus-
tify closure in cases which do not involve a threat to the life or
safety of any participant in the courtroom drama. If this appli-
cation is an indication of future judicial treatment of closure, the
Globe Court has perhaps opened the courtroom doors even
wider than had been intended by the Richmond Newspapers
Court.
John C. Hearn
125. See generally Abrahams, New Efforts in States to Expand Camera Coverage
of Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 116-18 (Aug. 1981).
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